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Abstract—In this paper we use the blockchain technology to
develop a peer to peer energy trade platform without a trusted
third party. Our main contribution is a novel distributed double
auction mechanism which allows any peer to act as an auctioneer
and the blockchain mechanism ensures that a peer behaves law-
fully while acting as an auctioneer. Using experimental evaluation
we show that (1) the distributed auction converges quickly, (2) it
minimizes energy loss due to long transmission, (3) computational
overhead due to employing a blockchain is negligible, (4) it is
efficient and (5) it can implement trade restrictions imposed by
the energy distribution network.
Index Terms—Microgrid energy trade, Blockchain, Double
auction
I. INTRODUCTION
Power grids worldwide are undergoing a fundamental shift
away from the traditional centralised system where energy is
supplied by large, controllable power plants to a decentralised
system based on weather dependent, non-controllable renew-
able energy sources. Peer to peer energy trade [1], [2] can
enable a more decentralized operation of the power system,
better utilisation of grid assets, and improved integration of
distributed energy resources via local energy balancing. Our
objective is to develop a trading platform for such peer to peer
energy trade.
We investigate double auction [3] as a trade model for peer
to peer energy trade. In double auction, buyers (who need
energy) and sellers (who have excess energy) submit their
reservation price (and amount to energy to buy or sell) to
an auctioneer. A buyer’s reservation price is the maximum
price it will pay for energy and a seller’s reservation price
is the minimum price at which the seller will sell its energy.
The auctioneer decides on the price for energy exchange and
subsets of the buyers and sellers who will trade. We may
use McAfee’s mechanism [4] to determine the winner (who
trades energy and at what price) of a double auction. There are
several problems with a centralized double auction for peer to
peer energy trade as follows:
• Robustness: Centralized auction is not robust as failure
of the auctioneer would fail the entire trade operation.
• Trust on the auctioneer: The auctioneer may collude
with a few peers to alter the result of the auction. Hence
peers must evaluate their trust on the auctioneer.
• Local Price: Price for energy exchange may be deter-
mined by peers who are long distance apart from other
peers. We will use [4] to determine winner of the double
auction. According to this mechanism the price for energy
trade is determined by bids of a buyer and seller pair such
that (a) buyer’s bid more or equal to the seller’s bid and
(b) there is not other buyer-seller pair who satisfies the
first condition. In a large network, it may happen that
such a pair of buyer-seller peers are situated at distant
locations from other peers. Due to long distance from
other peers they may not engage in energy trade. Hence
such price should not be used for energy transfer for the
entire peer network.
• Local exchange: Peers who are located at distant loca-
tions from each other may trade energy and it will cause
energy loss due to long transmission distances.
• Security: It is difficult to ensure security of information
shared in peer to peer energy trade. Also, such a trade
platform is vulnerable to cyber attacks.
In this paper we propose a blockchain based distributed
double auction for peer energy trade [2] to mitigate these
problems. Blockchain [5] mechanism allows us to securely
store transaction records between two peers in a peer to
peer network. Security of blockchain maintained transaction
record is guaranteed by encryption and distributed consensus
protocol. Blockchain mechanism eliminates the requirement of
a trusted third party to verify a transaction between two parties.
In the proposed distributed double auction, any peer may act
as the auctioneer and the blockchain mechanism ensures that
each peer acts lawfully while it acts as an auctioneer. In this
paper we present the following results:
• Blockchain based double auction: We present a
blockchain infrastructure to support a distributed peer to
peer auction where any peer can act as an auctioneer and
several local double auctions are executed in parallel and
asynchronous fashion. Blockchain mechanism ensures
each auctioneer follows the prescribed rules to determine
winners of each auction. Also, blockchain maintain se-
cure records of bids and result of winner determination
problem of the double auction.
• Local trade: The proposed distributed double promotes
local energy trade to minimize energy loss due to trans-
mission. It reduces the distances among the pair of buyer-
seller peers whose bids determine the price for energy
exchange and the peers who trade energy at this price.
• Convergence: The distributed auction solves the double
auction in an iterative fashion. We show that such iterative
process ends quickly.
• Computational overhead: We show that number of
peers in each of auction for the distributed double auction
is much less than the centralized auction and it remains
approximately constant if we increase the number of
peers. Hence the proposed distributed auction has neg-
ligible computational overhead as it uses a blockchain.
• Efficiency: We show that distributed double auction
can be as efficient as a centralized double auction. We
measure the efficiency of the auction in terms of standard
deviation of energy prices.
• Efficiency and trade neighborhood trade off: We use
a method to control the trade neighbourhood of each
peer, i.e., the set of peers whose energy requirement
information will be used to determine whether or not it
can buy of sell energy. Such control method can realize
the energy trade restrictions that the energy distribution
network imposes on the peers. We analyse the trade off
between efficiency and trade neighbourhood size.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we discuss
relevant literature. In section 3 we discuss the double auction
process for energy trade among peers. In section 4 we present
a brief description of the blockchain mechanism. In section 5
we present the blockchain based distributed auction. In section
6 we present experimental evaluation. In section 7 we conclude
the paper with future research direction.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Peer to peer energy exchange improves the reliability of
renewable energy sources and reduce dependency on the utility
grid. In cooperative peer energy exchange, peers exchange
energy to maximize the social utility. The non-cooperative ver-
sion of this problem requires designing a market where peers
can trade their energy. Multi-agent systems is used to solve
cooperative energy exchange among peers. In this problem [6]
we need to find coalitions among the peers and peers in each
coalition trade energy among themselves. In the energy trade
problem [3] both the buyers and the sellers want to maximize
their respective gains. [7] proposed a combinatorial double
auction for peer energy trade. [1] proposed trading strategies
for energy market among peers. Peters et al. [8] shown how
the the broker agent can learn the bidding price in the smart
grid market. [9] proposed learning mechanisms for the electric
suppliers to bid in the electric market. [10] proposed energy
trading protocol based on a energy trading policy. [11] showed
intelligent usage of energy storage to facilitate improve energy
trading among peers. In this paper we proposed a blockchain
based energy trade mechanism. It advances the state of art
in peer energy trade in several directions. Our distributed
double auction computes the winner determination problem
in a distributed fashion which facilitates local energy trading
among the peers, more peers are able to trade compared with a
centralized double auction and the distributed double auction is
more scalable than the centralized auction. Other peer energy
trade mechanisms are non-cooperative games [12], Stackelberg
games [13], convex optimization [14] etc.
Blockchain mechanism was proposed in [5]. The first
blockchain mechanism [5] uses proof of work as the dis-
tributed consensus protocol. Peercoin (https://peercoin.net/)
introduced the proof of stake protocol which uses stake as
the vote power instead of computing resource [15].
III. DOUBLE AUCTION AND ENERGY TRADE
Let,
M = (M1, . . . ,Mx) The set of x peers
G = (M,E) An undirected graph with
set of peers as its nodes
and E be the set of edges.
G will represent the energy
distribution network.
t = (t1, t2, . . . ) Discrete time instances
δta(Mi) Energy requirement for the
peer Mi at time ta.
δta(Mi) < 0 then it indicates that Mi needs energy of amount
δta(Mi) at the next time instant. If δta(Mi) > 0 then it
indicates that Mi will have surplus energy of amount δta(Mi)
at the next time instant and it wants to sell such energy to
other peers.
In a double auction market let n buyers and n sellers
attempt to trade identical goods. In such a auction,
B = (B1, . . . , Bn) set of n buyers
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) set of n sellers
R(Bi) (positive number) reservation price of buyer Bi,
i.e., Bi will buy one unit of the
good for the maximum price
R(Bi)
R(Si) (positive number) reservation price of seller Si,
i.e., Si will sell one unit of
the good for the minimum price
R(Bi).
(R(Zi), X(Zi))|Zi ∈ B ∪ S denotes a bid where X(Zi) is
positive integer indicating the
amount of good the buyer of
the seller wants to buy or sell
respectively
We may solve the winner determination problem for double
auction [4] as follows:
• We sort the reservation prices for the sellers in an
increasing order. Let R(S1) ≥ R(S2) ≥ · · · ≥ R(Sn).
This sorted seller’s reservation price list will be called
the seller curve.
• We sort the reservation prices for the buyers in a de-
creasing order. Let R(B1) ≤ R(B2) ≥ · · · ≥ R(Bn).
This sorted buyer’s reservation price list will be called
the buyer curve.
• Let the seller curve and the buyer curve intersect at x
on the seller curve and at y on the buyer curve, i.e.,
R(By) ≤ R(Sx).
• Sellers S1, S2, . . . , Sx−1 should sell their goods to buyers
B1, B2, . . . , By−1 at the price (R(By−1)+R(Sx−1))/2.
Buyer Curve
Seller Curve
Trade
x
Reservation 
Price
Buyers/ Sellers
Fig. 1. Winner determination process of double auction. The buyer and
seller curve intersect at x and the sellers in (S1, . . . , Sx) trade with buyer
(B1, . . . , Bx).
• The quantity Z ′(Si) ≤ Z(Si) that a seller Si ∈
(S1, S2, . . . , Sx−1) can sell is determined as follows:
Z ′(Si) =

Z(Si) if
∑y−1
i=1 Z(Bi)
≥∑x−1i=1 Z(Si)
Max(0, Z(Si)− θi) if
∑y−1
i=1 Z(Bi)
<
∑x−1
i=1 Z(Si)
(1)
where θi = (
∑x−1
i=1 Z(Si) −
∑y−1
i=1 Z(Bi))/(x − 1)
denotes the share of oversupply for the seller Si.
Following from [16], we may use a non-cooperative game
to determine X(Zi) in the above procedure. The reservation
prices of the buyers and the sellers can be modelled as
the strategies of the buyers and sellers in a non-cooperative
game. As shown by [16], Nash equilibrium exists for such a
game and efficient algorithms are proposed to guide the buyer
and the sellers to quickly converge to an approximate Nash
equilibrium. In this paper we do not investigate such strategies
of the buyers and the sellers. Our objective is to formulate this
centralized auctioning process in a distributed fashion using
blockchain.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN MECHANISM
Blockchain uses unspent transaction output (UTXO) data
structure to express transactions. If a peer say A wants to
transfer fund of amount x to another peer B then the following
procedure is followed:
1) A discovers the public key of B.
2) A constructs a transaction T with a set of inputs IN =
t1, . . . , tk such that (a)in all transactions ti ∈ IN A is
the recipient, (b)sum of transfer amounts of transactions
in IN is at least x and (c)there is no transaction ti ∈ IN
such that ti is input to another transaction.
3) After constructing the inputs, A chooses B’s public key
to indicate that recipient of this transaction is B.
4) Finally, A signs the transaction with its private key.
The above procedure has two features (a) unspent input
transactions insure that A has enough fund to execute this
T1 T3
T’1T’3
T’5 T5
T’’1
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Fig. 2. A peer informs other peers about its energy supply/demand require-
ment using transactions. Any peer can act as an auctioneer if it receives
multiple supply and demand transactions from other peers. If a peer fails to
solve a double auction then it forwards its unspent transactions to another peer.
If it succeeds to solve the double auction then it sends appropriate tokens to
the peers.
transaction and (b) A’s signature ensures that A indeed wants
to execute this transaction. After constructing transaction T ,
A announces it to the blockchain network. Other peers in the
blockchain network validate T using the following procedure:
1) They check if all transactions in IN is unspent, i.e., in
the blockchain if there is any transaction whose input
includes at least one transaction from IN . In such a
case a peer will discard this transaction.
2) They check if signature of A is valid using A’s public
key and whether B is a valid peer using B’s public key.
3) If T passes these checks then a peer will add T to a new
block and the block will be added to the blockchain.
The above procedure insures that A can not double spend
a transaction and distributed consensus protocol ensures that
a peer can not recognize an invalid transaction as a valid
transaction. Distributed consensus protocol insures that honest
peers will discard block created by a dishonest peer which
contains invalid transaction(s). It is assumed that honest peers
are the majority of the blockchain network and hence they can
discard invalid blocks.
V. BLOCKCHAIN BASED DOUBLE AUCTION
Figure 2 shows the overview of our method for peer to peer
energy trade. It is as follows:
1) Houses equipped with energy generators form a
blockchain peer to peer network for energy trade.
Houses in close proximity (w.r.t the energy distribution
lines) with each other become neighbours in this peer
to peer network.
2) Energy surplus or deficiency information are encoded
as blockchain transactions and a peer (a house) sends
such a transaction to a neighbour to express its energy
need. For example N1 sends the transaction T1 to N2
to express that it has energy surplus and N3 sends the
transaction T3 to N2 to express its energy deficiency.
3) Upon receiving enough energy requirement informa-
tion from its neighbours a peer executes the double
auction winner determination algorithm. For example,
N2 executes such algorithm with input transactions
T1, T3, T ′5.
4) If a peer finds winner of such an auction then it
creates appropriate transactions to reflect such winner.
For example, N2 finds that N3 and N5 should consume
energy and N1 should sell its excess energy. It makes
transactions T ′1, T ′′1 and T ′3 to reflect this result.
5) If a peer fails to determine the winner of a double
auction then it will forward its unspent transactions to
a neighbour. Such a neighbour may have more energy
requirement information and may be able to solve the
double auction. For example, N4 received the energy
deficiency information from N5 as the transaction T5
but it could not solve the double auction. Hence N4
forwards such information to N3 as the transaction T ′5,
who solves the double auction.
Now we present a detailed description of this method.
A. Transaction data structure
We represent the blockchain peer to peer network as an
undirected graph H = (M,E) where M = (M1, . . . ,Mx) is
a set of x peers and E ⊂ M ×M is the set of edges among
these peers. Two peers share an edge if they are neighbours
in the physical peer network or situated at close locations. It
will be assumed that two neighbours of the blockchain peer to
peer network can trade energy among themselves without any
restriction imposed by the energy distribution network. In the
general blockchain a peer can send tokens to any other peer.
But in this peer to peer network, a peer can only send tokens
to its neighbours. But all peers can verify these transactions.
We impose such restriction to minimize the distances among
peers whose energy requirements decide whether or not they
can buy or sell energy. We use the existing data structure for
blockchain used for Bitcoin 1 with several additional fields are
shown in Table 1.
A transaction with requirement field 0 will denote energy
consumption information from the smart meter of each house
(peer). Each peer will submit regular energy consumption
data at regular intervals. Hence the number of transactions
indicating meter reading will be fixed and equal for every
house. Say such number of transactions is 288 (i.e., meter
reading after every 5 minutes in a day). Each peer will be
endowed with 288 mint tokens during a fixed time in a day,
say at 0001 Hours. It can use one such mint token as the input
transaction to create a transaction indicating its meter reading.
In all such transactions, a peer can choose any neighbour as
the recipient and Consumption data field will be used to
record energy consumption information from the smart meter.
All other additional data fields mentioned in the above table
should be empty and such transaction can not be used as input
for another transaction.
1https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Main Page
Requirement ∈ (−1, 1, 0) It will denote the type of a peer.
−1 indicates that buyer and 1 in-
dicates seller. 0 indicates energy
consumption information from the
smart meter of an house.
Reservation It will indicate the reservation price
of the peer.
Trail It will indicate how many local
auctions an energy requirement in-
formation can participate.
Auctioned It will be a positive random num-
ber if the local double auction was
successful. It will be -1 otherwise.
Price It will indicate the price for energy
trade
Origin Stores the public key of the peer
who has announced the energy re-
quirement information
Expired 0 indicates the transaction has not
expired yet, otherwise 1
T ime− limit The time duration for which a
transaction remains active (i.e., not
expired)
Consumption Energy consumption (it is
empty for transactions with
Requirement -1 or 1)
TABLE I
ADDITIONAL DATA FIELDS IN TRANSACTION DATA STRUCTURE
Each transaction (with Requirement field -1 or 1) will de-
note the bid for one predefined units of energy (say 10 kWh).
A peer expresses the value of its bid using the Reservation
field of the transaction. Life cycle of a transaction is illustrated
in fig 3. At time t0: Every day, at a certain fixed time all
peers are endowed with a fixed number of mint tokens. Say
every day at 0001 Hours each peer is endowed with 10 mint
tokens. During next 24 hours a peer uses such mint tokens to
express its energy requirement. To do so, a peer will create
a new transaction with input as one of these mint tokens.
Hence if we expect that a peer will trade at most 10 kWh
energy (total energy it will buy or sell) in one day and every
transaction express the proposal of buying or selling 1 kWh
energy then, each peer will endowed with 10 tokens(or 10
transactions where each transaction represents one token). As
shown in fig 3 peer m1 was given the mint token T1 at time
t0.
At time t1: m1 uses T1 as the input transaction to create a
new transaction T2 which states that m1 (origin is public key
of m1) wants to sell surplus energy (Requirement = 1) and
its reservation price is 10. It marks Trail as 0, Auctioned and
Price as −1. Reservation price will be measured in terms of
any currency as Cents. This means m1 will sell 1 kWh energy
for at least 10 Cents. m1 sends T1 to its neighbour m2 (m2
is the recipient of t1 as m1 broadcasts T1 to its neighbours
in the blockchain peer to peer network).
At time t2: Next, m2 fails to solve the double auction as it
can not match T2 with any other transaction. It creates a new
transaction T3 to forward the energy requirement information
of m1 to another neighbour m3. It creates T3 with T2 as the
input transaction and copies all data from T2 except the trail
field. It increases the trail field by 1.
T1
T2
T3
T4
Requirement
Reservation
Trail
Auctioned
1
10
Input
0
-1
T1
-1
Requirement
Reservation
Trail
Auctioned
1
10
Input
0
-1
T2
-1
Requirement
Reservation
Trail
Auctioned
-1
14
Input
0
-1
T10
Price -1
Requirement
Reservation
Trail
Auctioned
-1
10
Input
10
0101
T4
Price 12
Requirement
Reservation
Trail
Auctioned
1
10
Input
10
0101
T3
t0
t1
t2
t2
t3
t3
m1
m2
m3
m4
Origin m4
Price
Price
Price
Origin
Origin
Origin
Origin
12
m1
m1
Fig. 3. Life cycle of a transaction. Edges are marked with time of transaction.
At time t3: m3 also received another transaction T4 and it
solves the double auction using T3 and T4. It finds the price
12. Now m3 creates two transactions T5 and T6. It sends T5
with requirement -1, trail as maximum allowed trail value and
Auctioned as any random number and price as 12 to the peer
m1. T5 indicates the result of the double action as it indicates
m1 can sell 1 WKwat energy for the price 12. Similarly, T6
indicates m4 can use 1 kWh energy for the price 12.
Note that,
• Energy requirement information can be forwarded to
distant peers gradually by increasing the Trail data field.
• The movement of a transaction, i.e., distance between
the creator of an energy requirement information and the
peer who matches it with another such information can
be restricted using the trail field. For example, m3 acts
as an auctioneer for the energy requirement information
from m1 and m4 because its distance (number of edges
in the shortest path of the peer to peer network) is less
than maximum trail number.
• Transactions expires after a fixed duration, say 30 mins.
If the current time is more than 30 mins of the creation
time of a transaction then it will expire. Time − limit
field in the transaction data structure denotes such time
duration.
• Transactions expires after its trail number becomes equal
or more than maximum allowed trail number.
B. Distributed consensus protocol
We will use proof of work distributed consensus protocol
to create and maintain blockchain. Distributed consensus pro-
tocol ensures that peers of a blockchain peer to peer network
reach consensus about validity of a transaction, i.e., they all
agree that the transaction is valid or invalid. Also, miners
compete to add new blocks to the blockchain as there is
a financial reward for doing so. The distributed consensus
protocol determines winners of such a race to add new blocks
to the blockchain. It may happen that two or more miners
may add a new block almost at the same time. Such an
event creates fork in the blockchain, i.e., the chain splits into
multiple chains. The distributed consensus protocol eliminates
such fork. In proof of work, a miner have to solve a puzzle
before it can add a new block to the blockchain. Complexity of
puzzles can be controlled to modify the average time needed
to solve it. In this paper we use proof of work protocol. Briefly
the protocol is as follows:
1) Each miner maintains a blockchain head which is the
block whose distance(shortest path) from the first is the
maximum.
2) If a miner gets a new block(say B) it does the following:
(a)If the parent block of the new block is the most recent
block of the blockchain then it add B as its child and
recognize B as the blockchain head. (b)If the parent
block (say A) of the new block is not the most recent
block of the blockchain then it add B as a child of A.
But it does not change the blockchain head.
3) If it creates a new block (say B) then it add it as a child
of the current blockchain head and recognize B as the
blockchain head.
4) If any time, the block whose distance from the first block
is maximum is recognized as the blockchain head.
C. A peer’s workflow
We summarize the work flow of a peer : It executes four
processes p1, p2, p3 and p4. (P1): This process verifies blocks.
If the peer receives a block then it must verify that all
transactions in that block is correct. If a peer can verify that
a block is correct then it augments its blockchain with this
new block and broadcast the block to its neighbours. (P2):
This process keeps record of new transaction which are not
added to the blockchain. A peer may receive transactions
from its neighbours and it updates a list of undocumented
transactions with such transactions. This list will be updated
by input from P1 as transactions in a valid new block is
removed from this list. (P3): This process creates transactions
to announce its energy supply/demand requirement, solves
double auctions (using Algorithm 1) and if it fails to solve
the double auction then create transactions to forward its
unspent supply and demand transactions to a neighbouring
peer and it broadcasts such transactions or smart contracts to
its neighbours. (P4): This process creates blocks. This process
(a) verifies undocumented transactions and (b) groups a fixed
number of transactions into a new block. If a peer can create a
new block then it augment its blockchain with this new block
and broadcast the new block to its neighbours. This process
can be interrupted by P1 if the peer receives a new valid block
which contains transactions used to build the new block under
construction.
Start
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Augment 
BlockChain Broadcast
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Transaction
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Fig. 4. peer’s workflow
D. Actual energy transfer and payments
Note that the outcome an auction only indicates how much
energy a peer should consume or contribute. But the actual
energy consumption may be different and it will be recorded
as transaction with Requirement field 0. We propose to create
smart contract for payments. Given the result of each auction,
the peers can form a smart contract among them. For example
if the result of the auction states that peer mi should sell x
units of energy at price y between time [t1, t2] and mj should
buy x units of energy at price y between time [t1, t2] then, the
smart contract will involve two parties mi and mj , it will be
funded by mj with crypto-currency of value x ∗ y. This smart
contract will be triggered by energy consumption information
from mi and mj and such information will decide the actual
payment. For example, say mi only contributes x1 < x units
of energy. Hence it will be paid x1 ∗y tokens and (x−x1)∗y
tokens will be sent back to mj . Such a crypto-currency can be
part of the blockchain infrastructure for energy trade and peers
must buy these tokens with any other currency (i.e., $). But the
tokens used for energy trade information and auction is free as
each peer is endowed with fixed number of tokens to express
their future energy needs and actual energy consumption every
day at a fixed time. Sidechains [17] can be used to implement
this form of payment for peer to peer energy trade.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We collected energy consumption data from 100 houses. We
collected the energy demand (in kWh) and energy produced (in
kWh) by solar panels at each house in every five minutes. fig
5 shows the energy surplus or deficiency (in kWh) for every
5 minutes. We simulate a proof of work based blockchain,
energy distribution network and peers using agent based
modelling and asynchronous event simulation in Python. We
use three types of buyers (sellers) and sizes of each type of
buyers (sellers) are the same. Reservation price for each type
of buyer or seller is given in table 2.
Algorithm 1: Centralized double auction
Data: R(Bi, tj) and R(Si, tj) reservation price of buyer
Bi and seller Si at tj respectively
Result: Trade among buyers and sellers
begin
Sort Reservation price of buyers with decreasing
value
Sort Reservation price of sellers with increasing value
if ∃i : R(Bi, tj) ≤ R(Si, tj) then
Peers from 1 to i trade at price
(R(Bi, tj) +R(Si, tj))/2 and according to the
rules mentioned in section 3
Value Parameter
[10,15,20,25,30,35,40] 7 sets of peers
[10,20] Minimum and maximum bid
amount
[12,13],[10,11],[16,17] Buyer behaviours
[12,14],[10,13],[14,16] Seller behaviours
[10,15,20,25,30,35,40] maximum Trail
T ime− limit 1 iteration
TABLE II
PARAMETERS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION.
First we show the convergence result of the auction proce-
dure. We execute multiple local auctions in distributed and
asynchronous fashion. If a node fails to find the winner
of a local auction then it forwards the energy requirement
information to a neighbour. Thus it may take several local
auctions to match an energy demand. Hence it is important to
measure the number of auctions it takes to match an energy
demand. fig 6 shows the convergence time for double auctions
for 10,15,20,25,30,35 and 40 houses. The physical distribution
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Fig. 5. Energy surplus or deficiency data: calculated as the difference between
energy demand and energy production at each house.
Fig. 6. Convergence time for double auction
Fig. 7. Input size for distributed auctions.
network of these houses are line graphs. In fig 6, we plotted
the number energy demand transactions which matched with
energy supply transactions w.r.t number of auctions. Number
of auctions is collected from the ’Trail’ field of the transaction
data. We found that for all sets of houses it takes 6 auctions
to match 95% energy demands.
Next we measure the computational overhead at every
node due to using blockchain based distributed auction. It is
measured as the input size for each local auctions. As shown
in fig 7, we found that input size is between .05% to .2% of the
input size for centralized double auction. Hence computational
overhead for local auctions is much lower than centralized
auction.
Now we measure the performance of our method in terms
of distances among the houses who participate in each local
auction. We aim to minimize such distances to minimize
energy loss due to transmission and also, houses located at
long distances from each other may not exchange energy and
their energy requirement information should not be used to de-
termine if they can buy or sell energy. As shown in fig 8, such
a distance remains approximately constant for the distributed
Fig. 8. Distances among peers who participate in a local auction.
Fig. 9. Efficiency of the distributed auction
double auction for 7 sets of peers of size 10,15,20,25,30,35,40
with maximum trail number 5. It shows that trail number in the
transaction data structure can efficiently control such distance.
In case of centralized double auction, such distance increases
as number of peers are increased.
Next we analyze efficiency of the distributed algorithm in
terms of differences of the price determined by the local
auctions. In a centralized auction bids from all peers are used
to determine price for energy trade. But in distributed auction,
each local auction only uses bids from a subset of peers. Hence
prices for energy trade can differ for these local auctions. We
measure the efficiency of distributed double auction as the
standard deviation of prices for energy trade at various local
auctions. As shown in fig 9, we found that standard deviation
is between [0,1.5]. We also observe that standard deviation is
large with high number number of peers with energy surplus.
We also observed that we can lower the standard deviation by
lowering the difference between maximum and minimum bid
value.
Next we show the trade off between maximum trail number
and efficiency of the distributed double auction. In sets of
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Fig. 10. Trade off between efficiency and maximum trail number
Fig. 11. Number of matched transactions
houses of sizes 10, 15 and 20 respectively, we simulate
energy trade with maximum trail number 3,4 and 5. As shown
in fig 10, standard deviation of prices from local auctions
decreases as we increase the maximum trail number. Thus
depending on the topology of the distribution network we
can set appropriate maximum trail number to increase the
efficiency of the distributed auction method.
Finally we show the number of satisfied energy requirement
requests, i.e., request to sell energy is approved by the auction
and vice-versa. Fig 11 shows the % of such satisfied energy
buy or sell requests for 7 sets of peers. We found that on
average 20% requests are satisfied and all energy sell requests
are satisfied. It shows that our solution does not prevent sell
of any surplus energy if there is a demand for it.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a blockchain assisted distributed
double auction to facilitate peer to peer energy trade. We use
blockchain to compute the double auction winner determina-
tion problem in a distributed and asynchronous fashion. We
showed that this distributed auction promotes local energy
transfer more than a centralized auction. We showed that
the distributed auction quickly converges and computational
overhead is negligible. In future we will extend this distributed
auction with strategies for peers to improve their utilities.
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